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Abstract: We use new US county level data (3,058 observations) from 1970 to 1998 to explore the 
relationship between economic growth and the size of government at three levels: federal, state and local.  
Using 3SLS-IV estimation we find that the size of federal, state and local government all either negatively 
correlate with or are uncorrelated with economic growth.  We find no evidence that government is more 
efficient at more or less decentralized levels.  Furthermore, while we cannot separate out the productive and 
redistributive services of government, we document that the county-level income distribution became 
slightly wider from 1970 to 1998.  Our findings suggest that a release of government-employed labor inputs 
to the private sector would be growth-enhancing. 
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I.  Introduction 
 We study the role of various levels of government (federal, state and local) in US 
growth determination from 1970 to 1998.  Our analysis is based on the exceptionally rich 
county-level dataset that has been assembled recently by Higgins, et al. (2006), Young, et 
al. (2006a) and Young, et al. (2006b) to study conditional convergence in the US.  In 
contrast to the 100 to 150 observations typical in the extant literature, the data contain 
over 3,000 county-level observations.  To measure the extent of the government’s 
involvement in the economy, we use the percentage of the population employed by the 
federal, state, and local governments in each county.    
 These variables complement those typically used in the literature.  For example, 
taxes, government expenditures, and government capital stocks have been used as proxies 
for the extent of the public sector (Atkinson, 1995; Slemrod, 1995; Agel, et al., 1997; 
and, Rodrik, 2005).  We, in contrast, use a direct measure of the percent of a county's 
labor force that is under the direction of some level of government.  Furthermore, 
whereas some studies (e.g., Sala-i-Martin 1997a and 1997b) are able to break down 
government expenditures into investment, consumption and education, we analyze the 
effects of the public sector at the federal, state and local levels separately.  As far as we 
know, no studies have used government employment data at varying degrees of 
decentralization for studying economic growth.  
 Moreover, the large number of cross-sectional observations allows us to study the 
US as a whole as well three sets of sub-samples of interest: (i) metro and non-metro 
counties, (ii) five US regions (Great Lakes, Northeast, Plains, Southern, and Western 
states), and (iii) 32 individual states.  Metro and non-metro sub-samples allow for the 
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possibility that government's effect on economic growth varies with population density.  
For instance, a higher population density may lead to negative externalities that the public 
sector is uniquely suited to deal with.  Furthermore, regional and individual state samples 
allow for the possibility of heterogeneity of institutions and cultures conducive to 
relatively good or bad government (in terms of growth-determination).  For example, the 
general view of what activities government should pursue may be radically different in 
various sections of the country.  This carries over to the federal level if individual states 
request, allow, and/or encourage different types of federal activities; then the effects of 
government on economic growth may be significantly different.   
 In addition to the three measures of government employment variables, our 
analysis incorporates 38 other variables (as well as state-dummies for the nation-wide 
samples) to condition the growth rates of per capita income on.  Given the large number 
of cross-sectional observations, our analysis represents a unique response to the criticisms 
of Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997a and 1997b) and Sala-i-Martin, et al. 
(2004).  These authors note that finding statistically significant effects for measures of the 
public sector is not robust as it is very sensitive to the inclusion of other conditioning 
variables.1  Motivated by the "extreme bounds" analysis of Leamer (1983), they devise 
methods to determine robustness in the face of a large number of conditioning variables 
when degrees of freedom only allow a small number of conditioning variables in a given 
regression.  With over 3,000 county-level observations, we can include a large number of 
                                                 
1
  Levine and Renelt (1992) incorporate over 50 conditioning variables while Sala-i-Martin (1997a and 
1997b) and Sala-i-Martin, et al. (2004) incorporate over 60.  Studies of economic growth at the country-
level have, taken together, considered as many as 90 different variables as potential growth determinants 
(Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Durlauf, 2001).  As Brock and Durlauf (2001, p.7) emphasize, however, there are 
“at best about 120 countries’ data available for analysis in cross-sections [and therefore] it is far from 
obvious how to formulate firm inferences about any particular explanation of growth."  Such an 
observation holds for studies using US state-level data as well. 
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conditioning variables while maintaining ample degrees of freedom.        
 In terms of econometric methodology, we follow Higgins, et al. (2006) and 
employ a cross-sectional variant of a 3SLS-IV approach first developed by Evans 
(1997b) for estimating the growth equations.  Evans (1997b) and Caselli, et al. (1996) 
show that data must satisfy highly implausible conditions for OLS estimators to be 
consistent.  The 3SLS-IV estimation differences uncontrolled heterogeneity out of 
income growth rates and then consistently estimates the effect of initial income levels; 
that estimated effect is then used to recover the effect of government variables in the 
third-stage estimation.2   
To briefly summarize the main results, we find that the size of the US government 
at all three levels of decentralization (federal, state, and local) is either uncorrelated with 
or is negatively correlated with US county-level economic growth.  Moreover, we find no 
evidence of government activities becoming more productive at more (or less) 
decentralized levels.  Although we find that the county-level income distribution became 
marginally wider from 1970 to 1998, it does not appear that the lack of productive 
contribution of the public sector was compensated for by changes in the nature or the 
scope of its redistributive effects. We conclude that government activities at all three 
levels of decentralization are unproductive in the long run as they are growth-hindering. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section II discusses the 
relation of this paper to recent literature on US growth determination; section III 
discusses our econometric methodology and data; section IV presents and discusses our 
                                                 
2
 Caselli, et al. (1996) suggests a panel GMM method that differences out omitted variable bias and uses 
instruments to alleviate endogeneity concerns.  This method, however, is useful if there is enough time 
sectional dimension and, therefore, a cross-sectional estimation technique appears more appropriate. See 
footnote 9 below. 
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empirical findings; and section V concludes. 
 
II. Government and growth in the US 
 We focus on the percentage of a county’s population employed by (i) the federal 
government, (ii) the state government, and (iii) the local government.  From a long-run 
perspective these can be viewed as either the stock of labor force under the allocative 
command of the public sector, or they can be considered as the (annual) flow of labor 
services into the production of government services.  
 The extant literature focusing on US data uses state-level government capital 
and/or expenditure variables in a production function framework.  Recent examples 
include Evans and Karras (1994) who use disaggregated government capital and 
expenditure measures.  They conclude that only current government expenditures on 
education are productive and government capital, as an input, has a negative effect on 
productivity.  Holtz-Eakin (1994, p. 13) also finds "…essentially no role for public-sector 
capital at the margin."  Garcia-Milàl, et al. (1996) echo this finding.  
 Shioji (2001) criticizes the production function approach and instead derives a 
version of an income convergence equation (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 and Mankiw, 
et al., 1992).  Shioji finds that the infrastructure component of government capital has a 
positive effect on economic growth.     
 The variables we use complement the aforementioned studies and offer several 
advantages.  First, they allow us to explore how the relationship between government and 
growth differs at three levels of decentralization.  Second, they are helpful when 
externalities are present across geographical units.  For example, a state government may 
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operate educational institutions (at a cost detectable in a growth regression) only to have 
many of the students graduate and leave to live and work elsewhere (creating benefits not 
detectable in growth regressions).  As another example, a negative coefficient on the 
federal government measure might be questioned because federal services are spread 
across the nation.  In general, one would expect externalities across counties to be less 
important for analyzing state than federal government, and even less important for 
analyzing local than state government.  We can at least separate out the local government 
contribution.  
 Finally, the percentage of a population employed by some level of government 
gives a direct perspective on government involvement, i.e., how much of the labor force is 
directed by government, rather than simply how much it spends or how many structures it 
has built.  Of course, these are not mutually exclusive.  For example, government spends 
money on wages so that part of the labor force is involved in government activities.  Also, 
when government makes expenditures, in general, it competes with the private sector 
demand and, in part, determines the allocation of private sector resources, including 
labor.  This overlap makes expenditure and employment variables complementary.   
 
III. Empirical specification and data   
 A. The model and 3SLS-IV estimation procedure 
 The basic specification used in growth regressions arises from the neoclassical 
growth model.3  The growth model implies that, 
 
                                                 
3
  A derivation of the baseline specification is provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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where yˆ  is the log of income per effective unit of labor, t denotes the time, and B is a 
nonlinear function of various parameters (preference parameters, population growth rate, 
etc).  B governs the speed of adjustment to the steady state, *yˆ .  From (1) it follows that 
the average growth rate of income per unit of labor between dates 0 and T is, 
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where z is the exogenous rate of technical progress and B represents the responsiveness of 
the average growth rate to the gap between the steady state income and the initial value.  
Since effective units of labor (L) are assumed to equal Lezt, we have )0()0(ˆ yy = . 
Growth regressions are obtained by fitting to the cross-sectional data the equation, 
   
(3)  nnnn xyg νγβα +′++= 0 .      
 
In (3), ng  is the average growth rate of per capita income for economy n between years 0 
and T [i.e., ( ))0()(1 yTy
T
− ], the constant α is a function of z,   = 




 − −
T
e BT1
, nx  is a 
vector of variables that control for cross-economy heterogeneity in determinants of the 
steady-state, γ  is a coefficients' vector, and νn is a zero mean, finite variance error term. 
Caselli, et al. (1996) and Evans (1997b) show that OLS will be consistent only if 
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the data satisfy highly implausible conditions.  According to Evans (1997b), unless (i) the 
economies have identical AR(1) representations, (ii) every economy affects every other 
economy symmetrically, (iii) the conditioning variables control for all permanent cross-
economy differences, and (iv) the right hand side variables are exogenous, the OLS 
estimates of  are inconsistent—they are biased downwards.4 
Evans (1997b) proposes a 3SLS-IV method that produces consistent estimates.  In 
the first two stages, instrumental variables are used to estimate the regression equation, 
 
(4)  nnn yg ηβω +∆+=∆ 0 ,       
 
where 
T
yy
T
yy
g nTnnTnn
)()( 1,1,0,, −− −
−
−
=∆ , 1,00 −−=∆ nnn yyy , ny  is the log of per 
capita income for county n, ω and β are parameters, and nη  is the error.5 ,6  We use the 
lagged (1969) values of all nx  variables except Metro, Per-Capita Water Area, and Per-
Capita Land Area as instruments.7  Given our sample period, we define 
∆gn =
(yn,1998 − yn,1970)
T
−
(yn,1997 − yn,1969)
T
. 
                                                 
4
  These results, derived by Evans (1997b), are included in the referee appendix.   
5
  An immediate concern with the use of (4) is the reliance on the information from the single difference in 
the level of income (1969 to 1970) to explain the difference in average growth rates over overlapping time 
periods (1969 to 1997 and 1970 to 1998).  Given that the growth determination is a stochastic process, the 
potential problem is basically one of a high noise to signal ratio.  We are relying on large degrees of 
freedom to alleviate this problem and identify coefficients.  Indeed, we obtain statistically significant  
estimates for the full sample as well as for 32 individual states.  
6
  As Evans (1997b) shows, the derivation of this equation depends on the assumption that the xn variables 
are constant during the time frame considered, allowing them to be differenced out.  Since the difference is 
only over a single year and these are variables representing broad demographic trends, this does not seem 
to be unwarranted.  To make sure that this did not introduce significant omitted variable bias into our 
estimations, we ran the IV regression for the full US sample with differenced values of all conditioning 
variables included as regressors.  The point estimate of  from the modified IV fell within the 95 percent 
confidence interval of the Evans method IV estimate.  If  estimates are not significantly affected then 
neither are the third stage results (see below). 
7
  See the data appendix for details and Table 1 for the list of the conditioning variables. 
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Next, we use *β , the estimate from (4), to construct the variable  
 
(5)  0* nnn yg βpi −= .        
 
In the third stage, we use the OLS to regress npi  on the vector nx , which consists of the 
potential determinants of the balanced growth path levels. That is, 
 
(6)  nnn x εγτpi ++= ,        
 
where  and  are parameters and n is the error term.  This regression yields a consistent 
estimator, *.8  Also note that in principle  is the same as the OLS : it is an estimate of 
the exogenous rate of technical progress, z, or the balanced growth rate. 
 Thus, to briefly summarize the 3SLS-IV procedure we use, in the first two stages, 
it differences out any uncontrolled form of heterogeneity to eliminate omitted variable 
bias and then, in the third stage, it uses the resulting estimate of  to recreate the 
component of the standard growth regression that would be related to conditioning 
variables.  This component is regressed on a constant and the conditioning variables in 
“un-differenced” form to estimate the effects of conditioning variables on balanced 
growth paths.  This procedure is ideal for data with a large number of cross-sectional 
                                                 
8
  Technically speaking,  is not the partial effects of xn variables on the heights of the balanced growth 
paths. Those partial effects are functions of  and . However, if the neoclassical growth hypothesis is true 
( < 0), then signs of elements of  will be the same as those of the partial effects of given xn elements. 
Assuming that  is identical across economies, the size of  elements relative to one another expresses the 
magnitude of the partial effects relative to one another. Thus, while * does not allow for precise 
quantitative statements about the effects of given variables on balanced growth paths, it does allow for 
statements about the sign of such effects, and how important those effects are relative to each other. 
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observations and it also ensures that no information contained in the levels of the 
conditioning variables is lost.9   
Along with the 3SLS-IV results, we also report the OLS results for comparison.  
We used a Hausman test as an additional aid in determining the necessity of the IV 
approach.  Two tests were applied to the full US sample.  The first test was run on the β* 
values and yielded an m value of 134.6.  The second test was run on the entire model and 
yielded an m value of 1236.6.  Both tests reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the OLS estimates are indeed inconsistent, and confirming the importance 
of using the IV method for addressing the potential endogeneity of conditioning 
variables.10 
We follow Rappaport and Sachs (2003), Rappaport (2005) and Higgins, et al. 
(2006) in accounting for a possible spatial correlation between the error-terms of the 
counties located in proximity with each other. We report a generalization of the Huber-
White heteroskedastic-consistent estimator based on Rappaport’s (1999) implementation 
of Conley’s (1999) correction to obtain standard errors that are robust to such a spatial 
correlation.  These results are reported as “CR-OLS” (Conley-Rappaport-OLS) in Tables 
2, 4 and 5. 
                                                 
9
  This is a point on which Barro (1997, p. 37) has criticized panel data methods. As they rely on time series 
information, the conditioning variables are differenced.  However, the conditioning variables often vary 
slowly over time such that the most important information is in the levels. Indeed, we have estimated the 
model using a panel-GMM method of Caselli, et al. (1996) but the resulting estimates did not make much 
sense. We believe the main reason for the failure of the panel-GMM approach is that it is ill-suited for our 
data because our sample does not form a “true panel”: although we have over 3,000 cross-sectional 
observations, over time we only have three time series observations (the 1970, 1980, and 1990 decennial 
Census data) and it appears that it is not enough to carry the level-information forward after the variables 
are differenced, which is necessary for implementing panel-GMM estimation. 
10
 Some of the variables we use could be viewed as endogenous.  We believe, however, that the problem is 
not severe because in our model, the right-hand side (RHS) variables are temporally prior to the regressors.  
Also, we use instrumental variables (IVs) to account for the endogeneity.  Indeed, the Hausman test 
confirmed the appropriateness of the IV approach. 
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Rappaport and Sachs specify a cutoff distance d , and assume that the covariance 
between the errors of two counties is zero, if the Euclidean distance between the 
counties’ centers exceeds d .  Otherwise, they impose declining weight structure on the 
covariance by defining a distance function 2)200/(1)( ijij ddg −= , where ijd  is the 
distance between the centers of counties i and j.  It is assumed that ijijji dgE ρεε )()( = , 
where jiij ee=ρˆ , and 1)( =ijdg  for 0=ijd , 0)( =ijdg  for ddij > , and 0)( ≤′ ijdg  for 
ddij ≤ .  Consistent with Rappaport (1999 and 2005), Rappaport and Sachs (2003), and 
Higgins, et al. (2006), we assume that the covariance between the error terms drops 
quadratically as the distance between the counties increases to km200=d .  
 
 B. US county-level data 
 The data we use are drawn from several sources but the majority comes from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System (BEA-REIS) and 
US Census data sets.  The BEA-REIS data are largely based on the 1970, 1980 and 1990 
decennial Census files; the 1972, 1977, 1982 and 1987 Census of Governments; and the 
Census Bureau’s City and County Book from various years.  We exclude military 
personnel from all data. 
 Our data contain 3,058 county-level observations.  Figure 1 displays the US 
divided into counties.11  The large number of observations allows us to explore possible 
heterogeneity in growth experiences across the US by splitting the data into three sets of 
sub-samples.  The first set separates the data into 867 metro and 2,191 non-metro 
                                                 
11
  The figure excludes Hawaii and Alaska, but these counties are included in the full and regional samples.  
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counties.12  Given the large sample, the sub-sample analysis sacrifices little in terms of 
degrees of freedom.  The second set combines counties into geographic regions: Great 
Lakes, Northeast, Southern, Plains, and Western. Finally, the third set parses the counties 
up into their respective 50 US state sub-samples.13 
We use the BEA’s measure of personal income, which along with county 
population gives per capita income.  We adjust it to be net of government transfers and 
express it in 1992 dollars.  Natural logs of real per capita income are used throughout.  In 
addition to initial, we utilize 38 demographic conditioning variables, listed in Table 1.14 
 
IV. Empirical findings 
 A. Full US sample results 
 Table 2 presents the estimation results for the full US sample, as well as metro 
and non-metro samples.  Utilizing 3SLS-IV estimation (the results of which we focus on) 
we find a negative and statistically significant partial correlation between the percent of 
the population employed in the public sector and the rate of economic growth, regardless 
of whether one considers federal, state or local government.  Moreover, there is no clear 
pattern in the point estimates of partial correlations as the level of decentralization 
increases; and the 95 percent confidence intervals all overlap.  The coefficients for the 
federal, state and local employee percent of the population variables are –0.0226, –
0.0177, and –0.0198 respectively, all significant at the 1-percent level.   
                                                 
12
  Following Higgins, et al. (2006) who follow the definition used by the Census Bureau, metro counties 
are defined as those that contain cities with populations of 100,000 or more, or border such counties.  See 
Census Bureau publication SU-99-1, “Population Estimates for Cities with Populations of 100,000 and 
Greater.” 
13
  Due to the extensive number of independent variables the model is only specified for 32 of 50 states.   
14
  An appendix at the end of the paper describes the data in more detail. 
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 This relationship, however, might be nonlinear.  Government to a certain extent 
might be good for growth, but then becomes a negative influence as it expands further.  
For example, "with low tax rates, the positive effect of public production services on the 
productivity of private capital stocks exceeds the negative effect of [a] distortionary tax 
on private capital accumulation" (Park, 2005, p. 10).  Or it may be the case that 
government activities may be aimed at enhancing growth up to a point but then further 
activities, at the margin, may then aim at redistribution of income for equity concerns 
(Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).15  Yet another possibility is that there are certain goods 
and services which the government provides and which are essential for efficient 
functioning of the economy (e.g., legal and law enforcement institutions, public roads, 
airports).  As long as the labor force employed by the government is involved in the 
production of such goods and services, government expenditures can be growth 
promoting.  Expanding the size and the scope of the government beyond this, however, 
may be growth-hindering.      
 To check this possibility of a nonlinear relationship, we run the full US sample 
3SLS-IV regressions with both linear and quadratic terms.  We include 
222 )()()( LSFLSF lsssfsllslfl γγγγγγ +++++  in the regression model, where F, S, and 
L are the percent of population employed by federal, state, and local governments, 
respectively.  With the quadratic terms, the marginal effect of the federal government 
variable, for example, on the average growth rate is given by )(2/ FFg fsfl γγ +=∂∂ .  
Thus, a positive coefficient on the linear term and a negative on the quadratic term would 
                                                 
15
  Our analysis does not allow us to explicitly separate out redistributive activities of government.  If 
negative effects of government on growth are to be excused in terms of a tradeoff with income inequality 
then we would expect redistributive efforts bear fruit.  This is addressed in more detail in Section IV(C).  
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imply that the marginal effect of F on g is positive until a level of F where the second 
term exceeds the first. 
 The estimation results with the quadratic terms included do not conform to the 
above.  For federal, state and local government variables entered linearly, the estimates 
are negative and significant, as in the original regressions.  For the quadratic variables, 
only the federal government coefficient is significant and positive.  Using the estimated 
figures, significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively, we obtain 
))(0477.0(20331.0/ FFg +−=∂∂ , which, after setting equal to zero, implies that 
marginal additions to F are negatively correlated with g for F values up until 0.35 (until 
the federal government employs over 35 percent of the population), and then marginal 
additions are positively correlated with g.  The overall partial correlation between F and g 
would not be positive until F exceeded 0.60 (60 percent of the population).  Such F 
values, however, are unreasonable for the US.16  For realistic values, federal government 
employment (as well as state and local) is negatively correlated with economic growth. 
 The negative effects are also present at all levels of government employment 
whether one considers only metro counties or only non-metro counties as indicated by the 
figures in Table 2.  This suggests that government employment is not positively related 
to economic growth at higher population densities.  Indeed the negative partial 
correlations are larger for the metro sample than for the non-metro sample at all levels. 
While these findings may suggest that an increased public sector hinders 
economic growth via distortion of incentives and diversion of resources, another possible 
interpretation is that non-government wage growth simply outpaces government wage 
                                                 
16
  Only 9 out of 3,058 counties even have F values of at least 0.30.  Also note that military incomes are 
excluded from our personal income data. 
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growth, and this drives the result.17  In order to explore this alternative explanation we 
have assembled government and non-government wage growth data for the sample 
period.  At the state and federal level, Table 3 demonstrates that across the entire sample 
non-government wages outpace government wages in approximately 55 percent (a small 
majority) of counties.  At the local level, non-government wages grew faster in only 
about 30 percent of counties.  Relative sluggishness of government wages at the state and 
federal levels is dominated by wage growth rates in the metro counties.  For the non-
metro counties, which constitute a vast majority of 2,196 counties panel, non-government 
wages outpaced government wages in just over 50 percent of cases.18 
 If a relatively sluggish growth of government wages story were important, then 
we would expect to find smaller estimated coefficients for metro counties than for non-
metro counties.  This we do see.  The coefficient estimates for the regression including 
only metro counties are –0.0300, –0.0264 and –0.0214 for federal, state and local 
governments respectively.  For non-metro counties the corresponding estimates are –
0.0179, –0.0081 and –0.0128.  Note, however, that this pattern holds for the local 
government coefficients as well, despite local wages outpacing non-government wages in 
a majority of counties.  At least at the most decentralized level of government, a 
relatively sluggish government wage growth story is unable to account for the negative 
partial correlation.  Indeed, we estimate a negative relationship despite the relatively fast 
growth of government wages. 
 
 B. Regional Results and Individual State Results 
                                                 
17
  We thank Paul Rubin for bringing this possibility to our attention. 
18
   Table 3 utilizes data from 3,066 counties.  Our regression analysis utilizes data for only 3,058 counties.  
The difference is due to a lack of some data in eight counties.  
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 Table 4 reports the results for our five regional sub-samples: Great Lakes, 
Northeastern, Southern, Plains and Western.  These results are broadly consistent with 
our main country-wide findings.  All statistically significant coefficient estimates except 
those associated with the non-metro Plains region are negative.  The statistically 
significant coefficient estimates that are negative occur, variously, for federal, state, and 
local government.  Many of the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant.  Thus, 
the findings from the regional sub-samples suggest that government employment, at all 
three levels of disaggregation (federal, state, and local), is either negatively correlated 
with or is uncorrelated with economic growth. 
While not relevant for the full sample (see Section A above), the non-metro Plains 
region effects may be an artifact of the government relative to non-government wage 
growth.  Federal, state, and local government wage growth, respectively, outpaced non-
government wage growth in approximately 62 percent, 68 percent, and 80 percent of 
counties.  The relatively high growth in government wages may account for the estimated 
positive effect of government employment on income growth.         
Table 5 reports the estimates for 32 of 50 individual US state sub-samples.19  
Again, these results are broadly consistent with the conclusion that government 
employment, at all three levels, is either negatively correlated with or is uncorrelated with 
economic growth.  We find two exceptions to these broad findings.  First, the local 
government employment coefficient for Kansas is positive and significant at the 10 
percent level.  (Kansas ranked 8th highest amongst states in terms of local government 
employment with 4.2 percent.)  Second and a more notable exception is North Dakota.  
                                                 
19
   Given the extensive number of independent variables, our model was only identified in 32 of 50 states.  
By this we refer to the coefficient on initial income being statistically significant.  In the absence of this the 
interpretation of conditioning variable coefficients is unclear.  
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North Dakota has large coefficients on federal, state, and local government employment, 
all significant at the 5 percent level or better.   
It is not immediately apparent what might be peculiar about North Dakota.  For 
example, in 1970, North Dakota ranked 21st highest in terms of federal government 
employment (1.3 percent); 7th in terms of state government employment (2.3 percent); 
and 4th in terms of local government employment (4.7 percent).  However, similar to the 
Plains region non-metro case, federal, state, and local government wage growth was 
higher than non-government wage growth in, respectively, about 57 percent, 75 percent, 
and 85 percent of counties.  This exceptional government relative wage growth may 
account for the estimated positive effect of government employment on income growth.           
 
C. Are Redistributive Activities Driving the Results? 
 As mentioned previously, it is possible that the negative correlation between 
government employment and economic growth is due to the redistributive activities of 
government.  Redistributive activities may be detrimental towards average (per capita) 
income growth.  Furthermore, if greater income equality is valued in and of itself, then 
trading off that growth may even be viewed as desirable. 
 Our analysis cannot separate out the productive and redistributive activities of 
federal, state, or local governments.  However, under the hypothesis that the negative 
correlation (or the lack of correlation) between government employment and economic 
growth is due to redistributive activities, we can ask whether or not the economic growth 
has indeed been traded off for a more equitable distribution of income.  This will be 
informative as to whether the negative correlation is meaningful.  In other words, we can 
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evaluate a possible redistributive role for the various levels of government given the 
caveat that we do not control for how the distribution of income might have evolved in 
the absence of government.  
 Figure 2 displays the 1970 and 1998 distributions of per capita income across US 
states.20  The distribution has become wider over time.  On the other hand we can 
consider the Gini coefficients associated with the county-level income distribution in 
1970 and 1998.  The Gini coefficient associated with US counties' 1970 and 1998 (log) 
income is 0.0167 and 0.0165 respectively – a decrease of about 1.2 percent.21        
 Interestingly, at the county-level, although the dispersion of US per capita income 
widened from 1970 to 1998, it became a bit more equal.22  However, changes in both the 
standard deviation and the Gini coefficient are small enough to suggest that both 
dispersion and equality remained essentially the same.  
To try to understand further the evolution of the US county-level income 
distribution, Table 6 summarizes statistics computed from the 1970 and 1998 income 
distributions.  From 1970 to 1998, the skewness of the distribution increased from -
0.2244 (to the left) to 1.7240 (to the right).  At the same time, kurtosis increased from 
3.4334 to 10.3237, implying that the distribution has become more peaked.  
Cumulatively, this suggests that these two effects have been offsetting to a great extent. 
 In conclusion, we find no obvious evidence that government activities have 
achieved (absolutely) a more equal distribution of income at the expense of lower rates of 
economic growth. 
                                                 
20
 See Young, et al. (2006) for a discussion of this evolving distribution of income in relation to the 
apparent conditional (beta) convergence that empirical studies typically detect in the US economy. 
21
 The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality). 
22
   This statement is not to be confused with one concerning the distribution of US individuals’ incomes. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
 We use a recently assembled US county-level data containing over 3,000 cross-
sectional observations during the period 1970 to 1998 to explore the relationships 
between economic growth and the size of government at three levels: federal, state and 
local.  In contrast to the extant literature (Atkinson, 1995; Slemrod, 1995; Agel, et al., 
1997; and, Rodrik, 2005) that has used taxes, government expenditures and government 
capital stocks to proxy for the extent of government, here we use a direct measure – the 
percent of a county's labor force that is under the direction of government. 
 Following Higgins, et al. (2006), we use a 3SLS-IV estimation technique and 
report on full sample, metro region, non-metro region, five regional and 32 individual 
state samples.  We find that the size of federal, state and local government all negatively 
correlate with economic growth in the full samples, as well as in the overwhelming 
majority of regional and state samples (when statistical significance holds).   
 We find no evidence that government is more effective at more or less 
decentralized levels.  Furthermore, while we cannot separate out the productive and 
redistributive services of government, we document that income inequality in the US has 
widened slightly from 1970 to1998.  However, the change in both the standard deviation 
of per capita income and the Gini coefficient are small enough to suggest that both 
dispersion and equality remained essentially the same.23 
                                                 
23
 A reader might question the applicability of the neoclassical growth model to the US counties. We agree 
that the model may not be the most suitable framework for thinking about growth in US counties given 
their extraordinary degree of openness.  Rappaport (1999, 2004, 2005, and 2006) proposes a way around 
this problem by offering a version of the model for studying local growth, where by “local” is meant small 
open economic units comprising a larger entity, such as counties comprising the US The distinguishing 
characteristic of small open economies such as US counties is the extraordinary mobility of labor. The 
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 Given the ostensible goals of higher growth and/or a more equitable distribution 
of income, our findings are not supportive of expanding the roles of government, in terms 
of employment, at any level.  The US government use of the labor force seems to be 
either unproductive or growth-hindering at all three levels of decentralization. Taken at 
face value, our findings seem to suggest for a rolling back of government activities; 
specifically for a release of government-employed labor inputs to the private sector. 
                                                                                                                                                 
question Rappaport asks is how does labor mobility affects convergence. Rappaport (1999, 2005) expands 
the model by allowing labor mobility and finds that the model predicts conditional convergence, which is 
what Higgins, et al. (2006) find. 
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Data Appendix: Measurement of Per Capita Income 
 
Because of the critical importance of the income variable for the study of growth 
and convergence, we want to address its measurement in some detail. Two options were 
available to us for the construction of the county-level per capita income variable: (1) 
Census Bureau database, and (2) BEA-REIS database. 
Income information collected by the Census Bureau for states and counties is 
prepared decennially from the “long-form” sample conducted as part of the overall 
population census (BEA, 1994). This money income information is based on the self-
reported values by Census Survey respondents.  An advantage of the Census Bureau’s 
data is that they are reported and recorded by place of residence.  These data, however, 
are available only for the “benchmark” years, i.e., the years in which the decennial 
Census survey is conducted. 
The second source for this data, and the one chosen for this project, is personal 
income as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).24  The definitions that 
are used for the components of personal income for the county estimates are essentially 
the same as those used for the national estimates.  For example, the BEA defines 
“personal income” as the sum of wage and salary disbursements, other labor income, 
proprietors’ income (with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), 
rental income (with capital consumption adjustment), personal dividend income and 
personal interest income (BEA, 1994).  “Wage and salary disbursements” are 
measurements of pre-tax income paid to employees.  “Other labor income” consists of 
payments by employers to employee benefit plans.  “Proprietors’ income” is divided into 
                                                 
24
 The data and their measurement methods are described in detail in “Local Area Personal Income, 1969–
1992” published by the BEA under the Regional Accounts Data, February 2, 2001. 
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two separate components—farm and non-farm.  Per capita income is defined as the ratio 
of this personal income measure to the population of an area. 
The BEA’s estimates of personal income reflect the revised national estimates of 
personal income that resulted from the 1991 comprehensive revision and the 1992 and 
1993 annual revisions of the national income and product accounts.  The revised national 
estimates were incorporated into the local area estimates of personal income as part of a 
comprehensive revision in May 1993.  In addition, the estimates incorporate source data 
that were not available in time to be used in the comprehensive revisions.25 
The BEA compiles data from several different sources in order to derive this 
personal income measure.  Some of the data used to prepare the components of personal 
income are reported and recorded by place of work rather than place of residence. 
Therefore, the initial estimates of these components are on a place-of-work basis. 
Consequently, these initial place-of-work estimates are adjusted so that they will be on a 
place-of-residence basis and so that the income of the recipients whose place of residence 
differs from their place of work will be correctly assigned to their county of residence. 
As a result, a place of residence adjustment is made to the data.  This adjustment 
is made for inter-county commuters and border workers utilizing journey-to-work (JTW) 
data collected by Census.  For the county estimates, the income of individuals who 
commute between counties is important in every multi-county metropolitan area and in 
many non-metropolitan areas.  The residence adjustment estimate for a county is 
calculated as the total inflows of the income subject to adjustment to county i from 
county j minus the total outflows of the income subject to adjustment from county i to 
                                                 
25
 For details of these revisions, see “Local Area Personal Income: Estimates for 1990–92 and Revisions to 
the Estimates for 1981–91,” Survey of Current Business 74 (April 1994), 127–129. 
  
 
22 
county j.  The estimates of the inflow and outflow data are prepared at the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) level and are calculated from the JTW data on the number 
of wage and salary workers and on their average wages by county of work for each 
county of residence from the Population Census. 
Given the data constraints, it was necessary to use an interpolation procedure for 
some variables.26  In this study we cover the 1970 to 1998 period.  However, in order to 
implement the Evans’ (1997a, 1997b) 3SLS estimation method, we needed to have 
available data values for 1969 and 1997.  We used a linear interpolation method to 
generate these missing observations.  It should be noted that none of the data relating to 
income and population variables were generated by this method, as they were available 
from BEA-REIS on a yearly basis for the entire period covered.  The Census data 
variables, which were available in 1970, 1980 and 1990, were interpolated in order to 
generate the 1969, 1997, and 1998 values. 
                                                 
26
  Given the cross-section nature of our data, the use of interpolation does not cause problems of the type 
reported by Dezhbakhsh and Levy (1994) in their study of periodic properties of interpolated time series. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Definition Period Source 
Income  Per Capita Personal Income (excluding transfer 
payments) 
1969–1998 BEA 
Land area per capita Land area in km2/population 1970-1990 Census 
Water area per capita Water area in km2/population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 5-13 years Percent of 5–13 year olds in the population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 14-17 years Percent of 14–17 year olds in the population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 18-64 years Percent of 18–64 year olds in the population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 65+ Percent of 65+ olds 1970-1990 Census 
Blacks Percent of Blacks 1970-1990 Census 
Hispanic Percent of Hispanics 1970-1990 Census 
Education: 9-11 years Percent of population with 11 years education or less 1970-1990 Census 
Education: H.S. diploma Percent of population with high school diploma 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Some college Percent of population with some college education 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Bachelor + Percent of population with bachelor degree or above 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Public elementary Number of students enrolled in public elementary 
schools 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Public nursery Number of students enrolled in public nurseries 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Private elementary Number of students enrolled in private elementary 
schools 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Private nursery Number of students enrolled in private nurseries 1970-1990 Census 
Housing Median house value 1970-1990 Census 
Poverty Percent of the population below the poverty line 1970-1990 Census 
Federal government employment Percent of population employed by the federal 
government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
State government employment Percent of population employed by the state 
government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
Local government employment Percent of population employed by the local 
government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
Self-employment Percent of population self-employed 1970-1990 Census 
Agriculture Percent of population employed in agriculture 1970-1990 Census 
Communications Percent of population employed in communications 1970-1990 Census 
Construction Percent of population employed in construction 1970-1990 Census 
Entertainment & Recreational 
Services 
Percent of population employed in entertainment & 
recreational services 
1970-1990 Census 
Finance, insurance & real estate Percent of population employed in finance, insurance, 
and real estate 
1970-1990 Census 
Manufacturing: durables Percent of population employed in Manufacturing of 
durables 
1970-1990 Census 
Manufacturing: non-durables Percent of population employed in manufacturing of 
non-durables 
1970-1990 Census 
Mining  Percent of population employed in mining 1970-1990 Census 
Retail Percent of population employed in retail trade 1970-1990 Census 
Transportation Percent of the population employed in transportation    
Business & repair services Percent of population employed in business and repair 
services 
1970-1990 Census 
Educational services Percent of population employed in education services 1970-1990 Census 
Professional related services Percent of population employed in professional 
services 
1970-1990 Census 
Health services Percent of population employed in health services 1970-1990 Census 
Personal services Percent of population employed in personal services 1970-1990 Census 
Wholesale trade Percent of population employed in wholesale trade 1970-1990 Census 
College Town Dummy Variable: 1 if the county had a college or 
university enrollment to population ratio greater than 
or equal to 5% and 0 otherwise. 
1970 National Center 
for Educational 
Statistics 
Metro area 1970 Dummy Variable: 1 if the county was in a metro area 
in 1970, and 0 otherwise 
1970 Census 
 
Note: All BEA variables are available annually from 1969 to 1998.  The Census variables are gathered from the 1970, 1980 and 
1990 Census tapes.   
 

  
Table 2. Estimated Effects of Federal, State and Local Government on US Economic Growth (Entire US, Metro, and Non-Metro) 
 
 
 
Variable OLS 
Coefficient 
CR-OLS 
Coefficient 
3SLS  
Coefficient 
    
Entire US 
 
   
Federal government employment -0.0145 (0.0048)a  -0.0145 (0.0046)a -0.0226 (0.0051)a 
State government employment -0.0040 (0.0037)  -0.0040 (0.0045) -0.0177 (0.0040)a 
Local government employment 
 
-0.0211 (0.0048)a  -0.0211 (0.0079)a -0.0198 (0.0052)a 
 
    
Metro region 
 
   
Federal government employment -0.0095 (0.0098) -0.0095 (0.0105) -0.0300 (0.0107)a 
State government employment -0.0058 (0.0071) -0.0058 (0.0049) -0.0264 (0.0076)a 
Local government employment 
 
-0.0141 (0.0108) -0.0141 (0.0117) -0.0214 (0.0120)c 
    
Non-metro region 
 
   
Federal government employment -0.0137 (0.0056)b -0.0137 (0.0049)a -0.0179 (0.0060)a 
State government employment 0.0021 (0.0004) 0.0021 (0.0064) -0.0081 (0.0048)c 
Local government employment 
 
-0.0165 (0.0055)a -0.0165 (0.0087)c -0.0128 (0.0059)b 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. “CR” denotes a generalization of the Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard error estimator based on Rappaport’s (1999) 
implementation of Conley’s (1999) correction which produces standard errors that are robust to a spatial correlation. See the text for details. 
 
a
 Significant at the 1% level. 
b
 Significant at  the 5 % level. 
c
 Significant at the 10% level. 
 Table 3.  Government versus Non-Government Wage Growth Data, 1970 to 1998 
 
 
 
 
(a) All Counties (3,066 counties) 
 
 
 
Level Non-Government1>Government Government>Non-Government % counties where growth 
of government wages are 
greater than growth of 
non-government wages 
Federal 1,706 1,360 44.36% 
State 1,675 1,391 45.37% 
Local 909 2,157 70.35% 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Metro Counties (870 counties) 
 
 
 
Level Non-Government>Government Government>Non-Government % counties where growth 
of government wages are 
greater than growth of 
non-government wages 
Federal 573 297 34.14% 
State 532 338 38.85% 
Local 364  506 58.16% 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Non-Metro Counties (2,196 counties) 
 
 
 
Level Non-Government>Government Government>Non-Government % counties where growth 
of government wages are 
greater than growth of 
non-government wages 
Federal 1133 1063 48.41% 
State 1143 1053 47.95% 
Local 545 1651 75.18% 
 

1
 Non-government wages are the sum of private and farm wages. 
Table 4.  Estimated Effects of Federal, State, and Local Government on US Regional Economic 
Growth 
 
 
         
Panel A: Federal Government Employment 
 
                                     Number of  
Region  Area                 Counties          OLS        CR-OLS          3SLS 
 
 
Great Lakes All counties     435 -0.0004 (0.0147) -0.0004 (0.0081) -0.0029 (0.0152)  
Great Lakes Metro counties     140  0.0353 (0.0315)  0.0353 (0.0136)  0.0114 (0.0343)  
Great Lakes Non-metro counties     295  0.0074 (0.0192)  0.0074 (0.0057)  0.0110 (0.0194)  
 
Northeast  All counties     244 -0.0118 (0.0184) -0.0118 (0.0094) -0.0252 (0.0205)  
Northeast  Metro counties       90  0.0303 (0.0321)  0.0303 (0.0171)c  0.0163 (0.0357)  
Northeast  Non-metro counties     154 -0.0112 (0.0231) -0.0112 (0.0061)c -0.0267 (0.0252)  
 
Plains  All counties     832 -0.0201 (0.0101) -0.0201 (0.0100) -0.0261 (0.0103)b  
Plains  Metro counties     143 -0.0200 (0.0253) -0.0200 (0.0077)a -0.0139 (0.0283)   
Plains  Non-metro counties     689 -0.0182 (0.0114) -0.0182 (0.0120)  0.0187 (0.0102)c  
 
Southern  All counties  1,009 -0.0132 (0.0081)c -0.0132 (0.0054)b -0.0207 (0.0090)b  
Southern  Metro counties     252 -0.0212 (0.0199) -0.0212 (0.0097)b -0.0345 (0.0211)c  
Southern  Non-metro counties     757 -0.0127 (0.0092) -0.0127 (0.0073)c -0.0131 (0.0103)  
 
Western  All counties     538 -0.0134 (0.0105) -0.0134 (0.0081)c -0.0166 (0.0113)  
Western  Metro counties     242  0.0002 (0.0190)  0.0002 (0.0161) -0.0108 (0.0223)  
Western  Non-metro counties     296 -0.0081 (0.0143) -0.0081 (0.0083) -0.0103 (0.0149) 
 
 
 
Panel B: State Government Employment 
 
 
                                     Number of  
Region  Area                 Counties          OLS        CR-OLS          3SLS 
 
 
Great Lakes All counties     435 -0.0116 (0.0093) -0.0116 (0.0059)b -0.0181 (0.0096)c  
Great Lakes Metro counties     140  0.0015 (0.0199)  0.0015 (0.0049) -0.0203 (0.0214)  
Great Lakes Non-metro counties     295 -0.0188 (0.0110)c -0.0188 (0.0063)a -0.0223 (0.0115)c  
 
Northeast  All counties     244  0.0009 (0.0121)  0.0009 (0.0060) -0.0094 (0.0135)  
Northeast  Metro counties       90 -0.0106 (0.0267) -0.0106 (0.0110) -0.0172 (0.0299)  
Northeast  Non-metro counties     154  0.0124 (0.0139)  0.0124 (0.0033)a  0.0048 (0.0153)  
 
Plains  All counties     832  0.0132 (0.0076)c  0.0132 (0.0075)c  0.0063 (0.0077)  
Plains  Metro counties     143 -0.0178 (0.0140) -0.0178 (0.0145) -0.0356 (0.0152)b   
Plains  Non-metro counties     689  0.0274 (0.0088)a  0.0274 (0.0083)a  0.0161 (0.0092)c  
 
Southern  All counties  1,009  0.0062 (0.0068)  0.0062 (0.0059) -0.0047 (0.0075)  
Southern  Metro counties     252  0.0027 (0.0171)  0.0027 (0.0087) -0.0153 (0.0179)  
Southern  Non-metro counties     757  0.0043 (0.0076)  0.0043 (0.0055) -0.0042 (0.0085)  
 
Western  All counties     538 -0.0010 (0.0096) -0.0010 (0.0087) -0.0148 (0.0101)  
Western  Metro counties     242 -0.0040 (0.0137) -0.0049 (0.0113) -0.0206 (0.0160)  
Western  Non-metro counties     296  0.0124 (0.0148)  0.0124 (0.0107) -0.0037 (0.0154) 
 Table 4.  Estimated Effects of Federal, State, and Local Government on US Regional Economic 
Growth (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Local Government Employment 
 
 
 
                                     Number of  
Region  Area                 Counties          OLS        CR-OLS          3SLS 
 
 
Great Lakes All counties     435 -0.0362 (0.0125)a -0.0362 (0.0038)a -0.0343 (0.0129)a  
Great Lakes Metro counties     140 -0.0540 (0.0362) -0.0540 (0.0135) -0.0332 (0.0397)  
Great Lakes Non-metro counties     295 -0.0345 (0.0143)b -0.0345 (0.0061)a -0.0331 (0.0145)b  
 
Northeast  All counties     244 -0.0261 (0.0235) -0.0261 (0.0169) -0.0430 (0.0261)c  
Northeast  Metro counties       90 -0.0510 (0.0564) -0.0510 (0.0189) -0.1151 (0.0595)c  
Northeast  Non-metro counties     154 -0.0300 (0.0304) -0.0300 (0.0146) -0.0476 (0.0332)  
 
Plains  All counties     832  0.0001 (0.0084)  0.0001 (0.0115)  0.0048 (0.0086)  
Plains  Metro counties     143 -0.0156 (0.0200) -0.0156 (0.0162) -0.0066 (0.0223)   
Plains  Non-metro counties     689  0.0101 (0.0098)  0.0101 (0.0125)  0.0187 (0.0102)c  
 
Southern  All counties  1,009  0.0032 (0.0100)  0.0032 (0.0051)  0.0008 (0.0110)  
Southern  Metro counties     252 -0.0001 (0.0327) -0.0001 (0.0155)  0.0041 (0.0349)  
Southern  Non-metro counties     757  0.0066 (0.0104)  0.0066 (0.0046)  0.0061 (0.0116)  
 
Western  All counties     538 -0.0243 (0.0115)b -0.0243 (0.0081)a -0.0293 (0.0123)b  
Western  Metro counties     242 -0.0114 (0.0194) -0.0114 (0.0200) -0.0397 (0.0224)c  
Western  Non-metro counties     296 -0.0263 (0.0164)c -0.0263 (0.0095)a -0.0270 (0.0173) 
 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  “CR” denotes a generalization of the Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard 
error estimator based on Rappaport’s (1999) implementation of Conley’s (1999) correction which produces standard errors that are 
robust to a spatial correlation.  See the text for details. 
 
a 
   significant at 1% level 
b 
   significant at 5% level 
c   
  significant at 10% level 
Table 5. Estimated Effects of Federal, State, and Local Government on Growth in 32 Individual States 
 
     
      Federal Government Employment      __                      State Government Employment                       __                      Local Government Employment                    ___   
 
Region  ____OLS______ ____CR-OLS___ ____3SLS_____ ____OLS_____ ____CR-OLS___ ____3SLS_____ ____OLS______ ____CR-OLS___ ____3SLS___   
 
United States -0.0145 (0.0048)a -0.0145 (0.0046)a -0.0226 (0.0051)a -0.0040 (0.0037) -0.0040 (0.0045) -0.0177 (0.0040)a -0.0211 (0.0048)a -0.0211 (0.0079)a -0.0198 (0.0025)a  
 
Alabama   0.0327 (0.0635)  0.0327 (0.0013)a  0.0434 (0.0577) -0.0473 (0.0595) -0.0473 (0.0028)a -0.0514 (0.0579)  0.0221 (0.0573)  0.0221 (0.0019)a  0.0225 (0.0565)  
Arkansas  -0.0085 (0.0503) -0.0085 (0.0029)a -0.0119 (0.0514) -0.0164 (0.0393) -0.0164 (0.0012)a -0.0251 (0.0398) -0.0424 (0.0494) -0.0424 (0.0023)a -0.0242 (0.0493)  
California   0.0321 (0.0312)  0.0321 (0.0011)a  0.0322 (0.0304)  0.0134 (0.0488)  0.0134 (0.0031)a  0.0141 (0.0455) -0.0148 (0.0992) -0.0148 (0.0018)a -0.0137 (0.0943)  
Colorado  -0.0249 (0.0389) -0.0249 (0.0022)a -0.0643 (0.0451) -0.0338 (0.0384) -0.0338 (0.0024)a -0.0729 (0.0346)c -0.0174 (0.0339) -0.0174 (0.0026)a -0.0362 (0.0404)  
Florida   0.0821 (0.0821)  0.0821 (0.0035)a  0.0686 (0.0888)  0.0100 (0.0585)  0.0100 (0.0042)b  0.0223 (0.0632) -0.0228 (0.0894) -0.0228 (0.0023)a  0.0235 (0.0947)  
Georgia   0.0309 (0.0339)  0.0309 (0.0015)a  0.0078 (0.0365)  0.0301 (0.0232)  0.0301 (0.0013)a  0.0193 (0.0251)  0.0477 (0.0289)c  0.0477 (0.0032)a  0.0294 (0.0312)  
Idaho  -0.1485 (0.0881)c -0.1485 (0.0043)a -0.1368 (0.0648)c  0.0552 (0.0586)  0.0552 (0.0022)a  0.0458 (0.0365)  0.0379 (0.1142)  0.0379 (0.0060)a  0.0197 (0.0713)  
Illinois   0.0478 (0.0325)  0.0478 (0.0018)a  0.0487 (0.0322)  0.0034 (0.0195)  0.0034 (0.0007)a  0.0034 (0.0193)  0.0071 (0.0240)  0.0071 (0.0017)a  0.0071 (0.0238)  
Indiana  -0.0969 (0.0491)b -0.0969 (0.0011)a -0.0586 (0.0357)  0.0324 (0.0278)  0.0324 (0.0009)a  0.0009 (0.0297) -0.0311 (0.0381) -0.0311 (0.0015)a -0.0311 (0.0381)  
Iowa   0.0605 (0.0392)  0.0605 (0.0018)a  0.0607 (0.0389) -0.0414 (0.0236)b -0.0414 (0.0014)a -0.0423 (0.0231)b  0.0124 (0.0273)  0.0124 (0.0015)a  0.0137 (0.0265)  
Kansas   0.0281 (0.0394)  0.0281 (0.0024)a  0.0278 (0.0393)  0.0130 (0.0173)  0.0130 (0.0011)a  0.0113 (0.0171)  0.0329 (0.0183)c  0.0329 (0.0012)a  0.0337 (0.0182)c  
Kentucky  -0.0080 (0.0232) -0.0080 (0.0018)a -0.0058 (0.0023)  0.0155 (0.0200)  0.0155 (0.0016)a  0.0133 (0.0200)  0.0026 (0.0253)  0.0026 (0.0016)a -0.0001 (0.0253)  
Louisiana  -0.0428 (0.0309) -0.0428 (0.0008)a -0.0131 (0.0057) -0.0024 (0.0282) -0.0024 (0.0012)b -0.0130 (0.0336) -0.1463 (0.0500)a -0.1463 (0.0030)a -0.1792 (0.0589)a  
Michigan   0.0442 (0.0435)  0.0442 (0.0027)a  0.0740 (0.0500) -0.0091 (0.0291) -0.0091 (0.0007)a -0.0566 (0.0313)c -0.0100 (0.0335) -0.0100 (0.0023)a -0.0478 (0.0376)  
Minnesota  -0.1118 (0.0633)c -0.1118 (0.0028)a -0.0783 (0.0645)  0.0217 (0.0247)  0.0217 (0.0015)a  0.0048 (0.0247) -0.0461 (0.0235)b -0.0461 (0.0013)a -0.0431 (0.0246)c 
Mississippi -0.0521 (0.0591) -0.0521 (0.0017)a -0.0180 (0.0626) -0.0333 (0.0508) -0.0333 (0.0025)a -0.0303 (0.0494) -0.0467 (0.0675) -0.0467 (0.0037)a -0.1325 (0.0660)b  
Missouri  -0.0547 (0.0269)b -0.0547 (0.0021)a -0.0917 (0.0320)a -0.0292 (0.0210) -0.0292 (0.0018)a -0.0655 (0.0244)a -0.0243 (0.0244) -0.0243 (0.0028)a -0.0205 (0.0298)  
Montana  -0.0481 (0.0650) -0.0481 (0.0097)a -0.0739 (0.0632)  0.0457 (0.0493)  0.0457 (0.0108)a  0.0144 (0.0440)  0.0288 (0.0500)  0.0288 (0.0059)a  0.0260 (0.0508)  
New York   0.0254 (0.1075)  0.0254 (0.0036)a  0.0852 (0.1233)  0.0257 (0.0402)  0.0257 (0.0023)a  0.0609 (0.0450) -0.0314 (0.0712) -0.0314 (0.0042)a -0.0362 (0.0831)  
North Carolina -0.0570 (0.0544)c -0.0570 (0.0038)a -0.1263 (0.0648) -0.0129 (0.0238) -0.0129 (0.0021)a -0.0422 (0.0285)  0.0166 (0.0467)  0.0166 (0.0048)a -0.0101 (0.0568)  
North Dakota  0.1636 (0.0988)c  0.1636 (0.0098)a  0.2348 (0.1126)b  0.1326 (0.0691)c  0.1326 (0.0051)a  0.1604 (0.0811)b  0.2070 (0.0782)a  0.2070 (0.0086)a  0.2491 (0.0910)a  
Ohio  -0.0307 (0.0567) -0.0307 (0.0043)a -0.0263 (0.0574) -0.0072 (0.0263) -0.0072 (0.0018)a -0.0155 (0.0261) -0.0219 (0.0499) -0.0219 (0.0018)a -0.0002 (0.0485)  
Oklahoma  -0.1130 (0.0506)b -0.1130 (0.0080)a -0.1065 (0.0520)b -0.0366 (0.0357) -0.0366 (0.0019)a -0.0467 (0.0364) -0.0789 (0.0416)c -0.0789 (0.0023)a -0.0880 (0.0426)b  
Pennsylvania  0.0264 (0.0577)  0.0264 (0.0028)a  0.0267 (0.0285)  0.0577 (0.0287)b  0.0577 (0.0018)a  0.0620 (0.0283) -0.1015 (0.0593)c -0.1015 (0.0038)a -0.1000 (0.0592)  
South Carolina -0.0582 (0.1065) -0.0582 (0.0040)a -0.0520 (0.1028)  0.0183 (0.1384)  0.0183 (0.0042)a -0.0280 (0.1163) -0.0334 (0.1454) -0.0334 (0.0115)a -0.0270 (0.1406)  
South Dakota -0.0144 (0.0454) -0.0144 (0.0031)a -0.0384 (0.0424) -0.0043 (0.0323) -0.0043 (0.0019)b -0.0057 (0.0453)  0.0063 (0.0455)  0.0063 (0.0019)a -0.0057 (0.0453)  
Tennessee   0.0110 (0.0321)  0.0110 (0.0062)c  0.0054 (0.0353) -0.0267 (0.0330) -0.0267 (0.0027)a -0.0566 (0.0352)  0.0022 (0.0336)  0.0022 (0.0021)  0.0059 (0.0370)  
Texas  -0.0551 (0.0302)c -0.0551 (0.0039)a -0.0378 (0.0318)  0.0053 (0.0178)  0.0053 (0.0024)b -0.0007 (0.0188) -0.0252 (0.0210)  -0.0252 (0.0033)a -0.0271 (0.0222)  
Virginia  -0.0088 (0.0346) -0.0088 (0.0022)a  0.0053 (0.0404)  0.0390 (0.0413)  0.0390 (0.0027)a  0.0310 (0.0484)  0.0471 (0.0466)  0.0471 (0.0033)a  0.0261 (0.0543)  
Washington -0.0249 (0.0551) -0.0249 (0.0031)a -0.0085 (0.0885)  0.0167 (0.1323)   0.0167 (0.0065)b -0.0085 (0.0885)  0.1718 (0.3523)  0.1718 (0.0132)a -0.0502 (0.5439)  
West Virginia  0.0571 (0.0653)  0.0571 (0.0032)a  0.0980 (0.0810) -0.0060 (0.0413) -0.0060 (0.0019)a -0.0185 (0.0519) -0.0605 (0.0788) -0.0605 (0.0041)a -0.0067 (0.0975)  
Wisconsin  -0.0087 (0.0364) -0.0087 (0.0028)a  -0.0017 (0.0358) -0.0444 (0.0343) -0.0444 (0.0038)a -0.0375 (0.0337)  0.0191 (0.0400)  0.0191 (0.0021)a  0.0264 (0.0394)  
 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  “CR” denotes a generalization of the Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard error estimator based on Rappaport’s (1999) implementation of Conley’s (1999) correction 
which produces standard errors that are robust to a spatial correlation.  See the text for details. 
  
a
 Significant at the 1% level. 
b
 Significant at  the 5 % level. 
c
 Significant at the 10% level. 
  
Table 6.  Summary Statistics for Distribution of US Counties' Log Per Capita Incomes  
 
 
 
Statistic        1970 Per Capita Income    1998 Per Capita Income 
 
Standard Deviation     0.2728   0.2887 
Gini Coefficient      0.1666   0.1654 
Skewness                  -0.2244   1.7240   
Kurtosis       3.4334   10.3237 
 
Figure 1. 3,058 U.S.A Counties 
 
 
                                       
 
 
Note: Hawaiian and Alaskan counties are not shown. 
  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of US Counties' Log Per Capita Incomes, 1970 and 1998 
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Referee’s Appendix: Inconsistency of OLS Estimates 
 
The method of ordinary least squares (OLS) could be used to infer the values of 
β and γ  in equation (3).  However, Evans (1997b) states that the OLS estimates 
obtained from (3) are unlikely to be consistent.1  In order to demonstrate this 
inconsistency, Evans first specifies a general autoregressive moving average (ARMA) 
data-generating process for nty : 
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where ntε  is a zero-mean, covariance stationary error process independently distributed 
over time and across economies. The error term, ntε , is uncorrelated with nx , nλ  is an 
autoregressive parameter which lies on ]1,0( , and nqn θθ ...0  satisfy the restriction 10 =nθ .  
As such, tnt ay −  will also have an autoregressive representation and will be covariance 
stationary if nλ <1 or difference stationary if 1=nλ .  The common time-specific effect 
experienced by every economy is represented by the term ta .  Evans assumes that ta∆  is 
covariance stationary and independent of ntε .   
The common trend ta  for all the y variables will be the sole catalyst of economic 
growth in all economies if nλ <1.  In this case, growth is exogenous and economies would 
follow a balanced-growth path.  If nλ =1, on the other hand, then economy n  will grow 
endogenously since nty  diverges from ta  and the y  variables of all remaining 
economies.  The parameter nδ  controls for the relative height of economy n ’s balanced 
growth path if all the λ s are less than one.  If 1=nλ , then nδ  controls for economy n ’s 
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1
   This section borrows heavily from Evans (1997b), which can be consulted for further details.  
relative growth rate.  The error term nω  measures the portion of nδ  that is not explained 
by nx .  This error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with nx .  The inequality nλ <1 will 
hold for an economy described by the neoclassical growth model.   
 Solving equation (1A) backward from year T to year 0, substituting from equation 
(2A), and rearranging produces 
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.   If 0<nβ , then economy 
n  grows exogenously ( )1<nλ .  On the other hand, if 0=nβ , then economy n  grows 
endogenously ( )1=nλ .   
Now consider a special case in which every intercept nδ  is completely explained 
by the county characteristics included in nx  ωn = 0,∀n( ) and every series tnt ay −  is a 
first-order auto-regression ( )0=q .  Under these restrictions equation (3A) reduces to: 
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The estimator for βˆ  can then be obtained in two steps.  First, regress 0ny  on an intercept 
and nx  to obtain the residual nr  and then regress ng  on nr .  (This is simply the OLS 
estimator of β.)   Each term in 
−
=
−
1
0
,
1 T
i
iTn
i
nT
ελ is uncorrelated with the intercept, ny , nx and 
the residual nr .  As a result, one has 
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Making further assumptions that nα  is uncorrelated with nr , nβ  is uncorrelated with 
nn yr , and nγ  is uncorrelated with nn xr , equation (5A) leads to 
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The probability limit of the OLS estimator is then a weighted average of the economy 
specific βns.  It is a consistent estimator of that weighted average.2 
But what if the assumption that every intercept nδ  is completely explained by nx  
and also the assumption that every series tnt ay −  is a first-order auto-regression, are 
relaxed?  Relaxing these assumptions, and imposing the additional restriction that the 
sλ and sξ  and, as a result, the sβ  and sγ  are identical across all economies (for the 
simplicity of the exposition), (3A) can be re-written as   
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 Strictly speaking, even for this restrictive case, an OLS estimate less than unity does not mean that all the 
economies in the sample conform to the neoclassical growth model. Rather, it would mean that enough 
economies conform, so that the weighted average is less than unity. It would mean, therefore, that 
exogenous growth is the predominant case across the sample. 
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equation (6A) yields 
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As a result, equation (8A) implies that βˆlim
∞→N
p  differs from β  if either q > 0 (ynt – at is 
not a first-order AR process) or the cross-sectional variance of nω  is positive (not all 
cross-sectional heterogeneity is accounted for).  In other words, the OLS estimator is 
inconsistent unless (a) the log of income per capita has an identical first-order AR 
representation across economies, and (b) all cross-section heterogeneity is controlled for.    
Evans shows that the resulting bias from q > 0 is likely to be negligible in practice 
but the bias resulting from a positive cross-sectional variance for nω  can be substantial.  
This is essentially an omitted variable bias.  Evans demonstrates that 
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The bracketed portions in equations (9A) and (10A) are the ratio of the cross-sectional 
variance of 0ny  conditional on both nx  and nω  to the cross-sectional variance of 0ny  on 
nx .  As such, βˆ  and γˆ  will be biased towards zero unless the xs  are able to control for a 
large portion of the cross-economy variation in the ys . 
 The intuition here is that if a large portion of the growth of per capita income is 
explained by variables left out of the OLS regression, then the estimate of the 
convergence effect will be biased.  In general, omitted variable bias can be either positive 
or negative. However, in this case, theoretically, the bias is negative. Evans (1997b, 
Tables on p. 11 and p. 15) estimates βfor Mankiw, et al.’s (1992) international data using 
both the OLS, which yields inconsistent estimates, and the 2SLS approach (as outlined in 
section 2), which yields consistent estimates of both β and γ  He finds that the 2SLS 
estimate implies a conditional convergence rate between 4 to 5 times as large as the OLS 
estimate. The bias produced by the OLS in this case, therefore, is substantial. 
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